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VENDOR'S REMEDIES FOR VENDEE'S BREACH OF
CONTRACT.
A contract for the sale of land may be put in writing so as
to comply with the requirements of the statute of frauds, or, although it is in parol, possession of the land may be taken by the
vendee and he may pay the purchase money or make valuable
improvements, and thus equitably except the contract from the
operation of the statute. On the other hand, the contract may fail
to comply with the statute, or to be equitably exempted from its
requirements. It may conduce to clearness to treat these cases
separately. Let us consider, in the first place, contracts which
satisfy the statute of frauds.
The vendor may entitle himself to specific performance, that
is, to the payment by the vendee of the contrdct price. A bill
in equity is not the only means by which he may obtain this
specific performance. Assumpsit for the price is another. Such
assumpsit is in the nature of a bill for specific performance.'
Whatever the contract requires as a precondition of the vendor's right to payment of the money, must be done, to enable
the vendor to sustain the action. If the vendee's possession, if the
delivery to him of a deed, is to precede or accompany payment,
the deed or the possession must be tendered. It thereupon becomes the vendee's duty to pay the price, or if it is payable in
instalments, the appropriate instalment, and if he does not pay it,
it may be recovered in assumpsit, together with interest from
the time when it should have been paid.'
'Huber v. Burke, II S. & R. 243; Fore v. Gipe, 2 Dist. 822.
2Britton v. Stanley, 4 Wh. 114; Young v. Stone, 4 W. & S.

45;

Tripp v.

Bishop, 56 Pa. 424; Fore v. Gipe, 2 Dist. 822; Carner v. Peters, 9 Super 29.
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The consideration promised by the vendee for the land may
be something else than money. The assumpsit will then be for
the value in money of the-service or thing. If the price is to be
paid partly in money, payable at stated times, and partly in
whiskey; (e. g 500 gallons per year for five years) the vendor
may recover, in assumpsit the unpaid money and the value of
the promised instalments of whiskey, at the times when they
should have been severally delivered.' But, if the vendee is not
under an unconditional duty to deliver an article, having the option
to deliver it or a certain sum of money, the vendor cannot compel him to deliver it, but must be content to receive the money.
A contracted to sell a factory to B, for which B was to pay several monthly instalments of $108, "it being expressly understood
and agreed that said payments are to be made in merchantable
steel and iron poll-axes. * * * The prices shall be $10 per
dozen for iron and $12 per dozen for steel poll." This was held
to give B the right to pay either in axes or in money. He could
not be compelled to pay in axes. A was allowed to recover the
instalments in money.'
When A conveyed land to a railroad company, in consideration of its giving him a pass and erecting a station on the land,
and the company, while giving the pass, failed to erect the
station; A was entitled, in assumpsit to recover, not the value of
the land, but the money equivalent to him of the presence of a
station on the land, an amount which might be greater or less
than the value of the land.'
The veudee may have agreed to pay a portion of the purchase money in cash and to secure the rest by a mortgage. If he
declines to accept the conveyance and give the mortgage, the
whole purchase money will become payable in cash.'
He may have agreed to pay a sum of money, a part of it
down, and a part in discharge of encumbrances on the land. If
he pays the down money, and subsequently allows a sale on
3
Edgar v. Boies, 7i S. & R. 445. The increase of the price of the
whiskey since the making of the contract by the imposition of duties on the
licenses of distillers, does not reduce the quantity of the whiskey which the
vendee
must deliver.
4

White v. Hopkins, 52 Pa. 363.
-West Chester & Phila. R. R. v. Broomal, x8 W. N. C. 44.

6
Murray v. Ellis, 112 Pa. 485. The judgment actually rendered however, allowed him to give the mortgage.
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the encumbrance, he must pay to the vendor the difference between the sum of the hand money and the amount paid to the
encumbrancer, and the contract price of the land.'
It has been already intimated that a contract which though
it does not comply with the statute of frauds, has become enforceable in equity, by the vendee, because of possession taken,
and price paid, or improvements made by him, is also enforceable
by the vendor, who can recover the whole of the price in assumpsit.8
The effect of the vendor's recovery of the price would be to
make him a trustee of the land for the vendee. He could not
both get the price and retain the land.' The vendor, instead of
thus recovering the purchase money and thereby transferring
the land to the vendee, may prefer to keep it, and obtain compensation for the breach of contract. It is clear that he may do
so, and he is entitled to the difference at the time of the breach
between the value of the land and the price, when it exceeds that
value, which the vendee contracted to pay."0 How shall the
value be ascertained? If the vendor acquired the land shortly
before (e. g. 4yz months before) making the contract, the price
which he then paid for it may be taken Primafacieto be its
value; and the price mentioned in the deed to him is 15rinzafacie,
the price which he actually paid." It is not an adequate objection to the adoption of the difference between value and price,
as the measure of damages, that the price which the vendee has
agreed to pay is excessive.' Nor is this difference between value
7

Young v. Stone, 4 W. & S. 45. The mortgagee contracted as if he were

owner, to sell the land for a certain sum, and used the execution on the
mortgage as the means of selling. The price his vendee pays, not the price
at which the land is knocked down by the sheriff, is to be treated as the
amount paid by the original vendee on the encumbrance.
8Tripp v. Bishop. 56 Pa. 424. If the vendor has induced X to buy the
land by misrepresenting its qualities, B can deduct from the purchase
money the difference between what the land was actually worth, and (not
what it would have been worth, had it corresponded with the representation, but) the contract price. Rice v. Olin, 79 Pa. 39'.
9
Meason v. Kaine, 67 Pa. 126.
"Britton v. Stanley, 4 Wh. 114. In Farnesly v. Murphy, Add. 22, where
a vendee induced another to take out a patent in X's name but for him, and
then declined to pay the vendor, it was held that the latter could recover
exemplary damages; that is, the real debt being £42, could recover £159.
"1 Id.
12 Id.
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and price in all cases the limit of the damages which the vendor
may suffer, and for which, therefore, he is entitled to compensation. The vendor having made the sale, discharged workmen
who were putting up buildings on the premises. When the
vendee later indicated his intention not to keep his contract, the
vendor was obliged to wait until the following spring, before he
could resume the erection of the buildings, and was then compelled to pay higher prices for bricks. He failed also to have
his houses finished as soon as he would have but for the vendee's
contract to buy. Damages for these matters might be recovered,
in addition to the difference between the value of the land when
the vendee should have paid the price, and the price."
The vendor, finding that the vendee is not going to keep his
contract may, if he chooses, sell the land to another for as much
as he can get, and then compel the first vendee to pay the difference between the price in the first and that in the second contract.
Such a resale is so far a rescission of the contract, that the vendor
may no longer specifically enforce it, or any part of it. He can
not on any note, bond or other security for a portion of the purchase money sue either the vendee14 or his surety16, and the vendee who has paid a part of the purchase money, may recover
back so much of it as exceeds the loss upon the resale. 6
In most of the cases in which a resale has been resorted to
the first sale has been public 7 and by an assignee for the benefit'
of creditors, or an administrator, or a sheriff. It is not easy to
see however, why, were the first sale a private one, made in the
ordinary course of business by an owner, the same method might
not be resorted to on the vendee's default.
The resale being a public one, all must be done that is
fairly practicable, by the vendor, to secure a large price. The
second sale must not be so long delayed as to make probable a
change in the value of the land during the interim. Wantonly
to delay the sale while the land is notoriously falling in price,
would make it improper to use the price obtained at the second
sale as a means of admeasuring the damage from the breach of
"3Britton v. Stanley, 4 Wh. 114.
' 4Weast v. Derrick, 'oo Pa. 5o9 Cf. Keim v. Neafie, 16 W. N. C. 46;
"5Wotring v. Shoemaker, 102 Pa. 496.
16jacoby v. Stetler, 8 Sadler, 31. Cf. Wright's Appeal, 25 P a. 373.
'11a Bowser v. Cessna, 62 Pa. 148, the sale was by an owner, but public
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the first contract." The second sale must be properly advertised."
The vendee should have notice that there will be a sale, though
it is said that notice to him of its exact time and place is unnecessary.' ° Mere unskilfulness without mala fles, and negligence, unless it is palpable, will not vitiate the second sale as a
test, says Gibson, C. J." The terms with respect to the times
of payment of the purchase money will affect the bids, since, if
the money must be paid promptly, fewer persons will be ready
to compete. Hence, in order that the second sale may be a fair
test of the value of the land, as compared with the price in the
first contract, it is insisted on that the terms of the second sale
shall not be sensibly less favorable to the bidder, than those of
the first.2" The terms of the first sale being that one-half of the
sum bid should be paid on the delivery of the deed, and the balance in one year, secured by bond and mortgage, those of the
second were that the whole of the purchase money should be
paid at one time, when the deed and possession were delivered.
The second sale afforded no proper test of the value of the land,
and could not be used in an action against the vendee in the first
sale."2 Said Rogers, J.,_ "the terms of the second sale would be
likely to lower the price because it might, and doubtless would,
exclude a class of purchasers, who would otherwise be bidders at
the sale. There is a great difference between paying one-half or
the whole of the purchase money at the time the deed is delivered and possession taken." At a first sale, ten per cent of
the price was to be paid when the property was struck down;
the balance of one-half of the price was to be paid on the 1st day
of the next April, and the other half was to be paid in two equal
annual instalments. At the second sale, ten per cent was to be
paid when the land was struck down; the remainder of one-half
was to be paid on the 1st of the next April, and the remaining
half in one lump, on the 1st of April following. This was a
18Ashcom v. Smith, 2 P. & W. 211.
191d.; Herman v. Allegheny, 29 Pitts L. J. 347.
2°Herman v. Allegheny, 29 Pitts L. J. 347. Cf., as to a sheriff's resale,
Gaskell v. Morris, 7 W. & S. 32.
21
Ashcom v. Smith 2 P. & W. 211.
2
2Bowser v. Cessna, 62 Pa. 148; Herman v. Allegheny, 29 Pitts. L. J. 347 .
23Banes v. Gordon, 9 Pa. 426.
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fatal variance." Resort can probably be had to a resale, as a
means of ascertaining the vendor's damage from the vendee's
breach of the first contract, although that contract did not stipulate for a resale.'
If the second sale is too long postponed, or if the conditions
of it so vary from those of the first as to make the price obtained
at it no safe criterion of the value, what is to be the effect upon
the vendor's right to damages ? He is entitled to the difference
between the price the vendee agrees to pay and the actual (less)
value of the land at the time of the default. The second sale
should be treated as simply a means of ascertaining that actual
value. The consequence of so treating it would be that, if the
second sale departed too widely from the conditions of the first,
or was unduly delayed, it should be rejected as a test of the
value, at the time of the default of the first vendee, but that the
vendor should be allowed to prove that value in some other way.
There are indications however, that instead of this effect of the
deviations, they will destroy the right of action of the vendor.
In Banes v. Gordon,6 it is said that the vendor having made a
resale, but on different terms, "the only question is, whether the
plaintiff had a right of action against the purchaser at the first
sale. * * * The objection is not to the measure of damages,
but to the action itself," and the judgment below was reversed
because the trial judge had told the jury that if the terms of the
second sale were harder than those of the first, "that fact reduces the damages or denies them, according to the evidence."
Trunkey, J., remarked, in Weast v. Derrick,2" "when the resale
is for a less price upon other terms than the first, the vendor cannot compel the first purchaser to make good the loss," mysteriously
adding, "The basis is shifted. To refer such a case to the jury
would introduce an uncertain measure of damages, whereas the
24

Weast v. Derrick, ioo Pa. 509. In Paul v. Shallcross, 2 R. 326, Huswas not prepared to say that to require the balance of the purchase
ton, J.,
money at the second sale to be secured by a bond, and mortgage, and warrant of attorney to confer judgment, was not fatally to vary from the terms
of the first sale, which while requiring a bond and mortgage, did not require
a warrant of attorney.
2
Herman v. Allegheny, 29 Pitts. L. J.347.
269

Pa. 426.
Pa. 5o9. In Paul v. Shallcross,

2 R. 326, the action was on a contract. It appeared that a second had been made with the same vendee.
His failure to keep the second, did not revive the first.
2,oo
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only measure is the difference between the price of the first and
second sale." Apparently then, the vendor may, if le chooses,
keep the land and sue for the excess of the price which the vendee agreed to pay for it, beyond its actual value, but if he chooses
to sell the land a second time, he precludes himself from showing that actual value otherwise than by the price obtained at the
second sale, and if he cannot use this price as a test, because he
has varied the terms of sale, he cannot employ any other.
It is now proper to consider the effect of the statute of frauds
upon the right of a vendor of land against a defaulting vendee.
That statute enacts that all leases' estates, interests of freehold
or term of years in any lands made by parol and not put in
writing and signed by the parties so making or creating the same
or their agents, authorized in writing, shall have the force of
leases or estates at will only.
One effect of this statute is, that contracts for conveyances
of interests in land of more than three years' duration, are incapable of specific execution.
To compel a vendee to accept the land and pay the price at
the option of the vendor, would be to treat unequally the vendor
and the vendee; to put it in the power of the former to compel
performance by the latter, without giving a correlative power to
the latter.' Hence, the vendor, by a parol contract, cannot tender
a deed, or do the other acts made prerequisites by the contract
lo his right to the purchase money, and then sue for that money.
To compel the vendee to pay the money would be to compel him
to perform the contract, and it is immaterial whether this compulsion is wrought by a bill in equity or by an action at law.'
But the statute of frauds does not declare that a parol contract for the sale of land shall be void, and a deduction from this
omission has been, that an action can be sustained for damages
for the breach of it.' It is easy however to discover that so
great a sum might be recovered under the denomination of
damages, as practically to be a specific enforcement of the payment of the purchase money. No plan of assessing damages
may be adopted which would produce this result.
2
Bowser v. Cessna, 62 Pa. 148; Ellett v. Paxson, 2 W. & S. 418; Meason
v. Kaine, 67 Pa. 126.
29
Tripp v. Bishop, 56 Pa. 424; Bowser v. Cessna, 62 Pa. 148; Carner v.
Petters, 9 Sup. 29; Ellett v. Paxson, 2 W. & S. 418.
"Bell v. Andrews, 4 Dall. 152; Ewing v. Tees, i Binn. 450; Bowser v.
Cessna, 62 Pa. 148; Carner v. Peters, 9 Sup. 29.
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But, if the vendor is permitted to retain the land and to
oblige the vendee to pay the difference between its actual value,
and the larger price which he agreed to pay, the vendee seems virtually to do the same thing as taking the land and paying the whole
of that price. It was said however, by Kennedy, J., in 1841, that,
while the parol vendor could not recover the price (to allow that
being specifically to enforce the contract) he could recover "the
difference between the value of the property, at the time the defendants refused to fulfil the contract, and the sum agreed to be
paid as the price of it.'"" In 1869, Sharswood, J., regarded it
as "well settled that the damages to be recovered is the difference
between the value of the property at the time of the breach, and
the sum agreed on as the price." 32
In neither Ellet v. Paxson nor Bowser v. Cessna33 was the
rule in fact applied, but in the latter of the two, the similar rule
was applied, that the vendor might resell the .land and recover
from the first vendee the amount by which the price at the second was less than the price at the first sale. It is somewhat surprising to be told in Carner v. Peters34 where, without resale, the
vendor retaining the land attempted to recover the difference between "its estimated value and the contract price," "There is,"
(says Smith, J.,) "no authority for such a course. The vendors
cannot retain the property and recover part of its price. On the
vendee's default they have a right to rescind the contract, and
the unequivocal retention of the property operates as a rescission
Such rescission puts an end to the contract as the basis of an
action for substanlialdamages," but not for nominal. It is difficult to see how a rescission leaves the contract alive for the latter
sort of damages and not for the former. It is probably wise in the
present state of the decisions to assume that the vendor does not
rescitid by retaining the land' and that he may recover, for the
3

Ellet v. Paxson, 2 W. &. S. 418.
'Bowser v. Cessna, 62 Pa. 148; Ellett v. Paxson, 2 W. & S. was the
only case sited.
33
1n Meason v. Kaine, 67 Pa. 126, C orally agreed with A and B that
they should buy land, and that he would as agent, sell it, and be responsible
to pay A and B, one-third of the difference between the actual value of the
land and the larger price which they had paid first, but C's fraud seems to
have been the inducement to the application of this measure.
349 Super. 29.
35
Cf. Britton v. Stanley, 4 Wh. I14. The retentus of the land can no
3
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vendee's breach, the difference between its actual value, and the
price which the vendee contracted to pay.
One way of discovering the actual value of the land, in contrast with the contract value, is to make a public sale of it. The
price at such a sale, if its conditions do not materially vary from
those of the first sale, if it was fairly conducted after full notice
to the public and the first vendee, may be adopted as the value.
If the price obtained at that sale is less than that which the first
vendee agreed to pay, he may be compelled to pay the difference
by an action for tfie damages." The objection to allowing the
parol vendor, while retaining the land, to recover the difference
between its actual value and the price, is equally applicable to allowing him to resell the land and to recover from the first vendee
1
the deficit. Smith, J., remarks, in Carner v. Peters"
that "It
may well be doubted whether, under the trend of the later decisions, a vendor can recover the difference in price on a resale
where this amounts substantially to all the pecuniary advantage to be derived from specific performance of the contract, in
the absence of fraud or of direct loss growing out of the breach.
But we are not now required to decide that question." Doubtless it is illogical, refusing to allow a vendor .in a parol contract,
to recover the full price which the vendee agreed to pay, to
permit him, retaining the land, or selling it to another, to recover the difference between its value and the larger price, but
we are not sensible of any "trend" of the later decisions, save
Carner v. Peters, itself, that warrants the assertion that such
difference cannot be recovered.
When a second sale is resorted to, the first vendee is liable,
not only for the sum by which the price there obtained is less
than the price in the first contract, but also compensation for the
expenses and loss of time incurred by the vendor in preparing
for and .conducting the resale, and for the cost of the deed tendered to the first vendee before his refusal to perform the contract. '
But for expenditures upon the land e.g., in drilling oil wells,
which the vendor would have incurred, had he not made the contract, he cannot recover."
more be a rescission of an oral than of a writen contract.
3
GBowser v. Cessna, 62 Pa. r4 g; Ashcom v. Smith, z P. & W. 211;
Ewing v. Tees, Binn. 450.
S79

Super. 29.

38Bowser v. Cessna, 62 Pa. 148.
39
Carner v. Peters, 9 Super. 29.
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Inasmuch as the oral contract to buy land is not declared
void by the statute of frauds, the vendor may always recover
nominal damages for its breach. B orally agreed to buy from A
land for $1700. He afterwards purchased it at a sheriff's sale
on a mortgage for $1425, without trick, artifice or fraud. A was
put to no outlay on account of the contract. It was improper to
allow A to recover $275 but he might recover nominal damages."0
In Carner v. Peters," though the vendor was not allowed to recover substantial damages for the vendee's refusal to accept the
conveyance and pay the price (the vendor retaining the land) it
was held that the vendor was entitled to nominal damages.
It remains to consider the effect of fraud on the part of the
vendee upon the damages for which, on his failure to perform
the contract, he will be liable. It has been said that such fraud
entitles the parol vendor to compensation for the loss of his bargain, that is, to the difference between what the land was worth,
at the time of the breach, and the price which the buyer agreed
to pay for it. In Mason v. Kaine" C induced A and B to buy
land at a certain price, by promising to pay one-third of it, and
become owner of an undivided third of the land, and further to
sell it, as agent. A and B bought the land. No sale by C, as
agent, taking place, .it
was held that C's conduct in refusing,
after he had induced A and B to purchase the land, to pay onethird of the price, was a fraud, for which he *was liable to pay
the difference between the actual value of that third, and the
price which A and B had paid for it, and which he had agreed
to pay them for it. Substantial damages were refused in Carner
v. Peters 3 because no "fraud or bad faith in the original agreement was shown, and because it did not appear that the vendor
was misled or otherwise injured by the parol contract, or by the
vendee's failure to fulfill it. Mere refusal of the vendee to fulfill it, is not the fraud which entitles the vendor to damages.
Leases are assimilable to conveyances, and contracts to lease
to contracts to convey. If A orally contracting to lease to B
certain premises for five years, and, in order to adapt them to
B's needs, making improvements, B declines to accept the lease,
"Kohl v. Stover, 6 Lanc. 310.
Super. 29. The judgment below having been for the defendant, was
reversed, and judgment entered for the plaintiff for six cents damages and
costs.
4167 Pa. 126.
3
4 9.Super. 29.
419
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A's damages are not the rent which B had agreed to pay, that
is, the value of the bargain.
Failing to get another tenant for
the first year, A could not recover $2,000, the annual rent, since
to allow a recovery of the rent would be specifically to enforce
the contract. It not appearing that A was prevented, by B's
contract, from leasing to some other person, since at the time he
had no other offer, nor that the expenditures on the property
were for unnecessary repairs or improvements, nor that the
changes made unfitted the premises *for ordinary purposes, A
could recover but nominal damages."

"Sausser v. Steinmetz, 88 Pa. 324.

MOOT COURT.
WELSHv.REES.
Promissory notes-Effect of seal-Visible and material alterations.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rees executed a note for $i,ooo payable to Welsh one day after the re
turn of Samuel Rees to Carlisle. The note was made Jan. iith, 1891Samuel F. Rees returned to Carlisle April ii, 189i. On a line above that
,on which the signature was" placed was a seal. Assumpsit for $i,ooo with
interest was begun August 19 th, 1899. The defenses were (i) Statute of
Limitation; (b) alteration. The alteration alleged was the addition of the
seal by Welsh, after the delivery of the note to Welsh by Rees. No
evidence explained the presence of the signature and of the seal on different
lines.
Counsel for plaintiff filed no brief.
Pierce for the defendant.
Burden of proof is on holder of negotiable paper to disprove any apparent alteration on face of paper. Neff v. Horner. 63 Pa. 327; Paine v.
Edsell, xg Pa. 178. Note showing material alteration not admissible without explanation of alteration, showing it was lawfully made. Hartley v.
Corloy, 150 Pa. 03; Hill v. Cooley, 46 Pa. 259.

Addition of seal is material

alteration. r Randolph on Commercial Paper. sec. 7o; Biery v. Haines, 5
Whar. 563.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
KLEEMANN, J:-The addition of a seal to a note is a material alteration. I Randolph on Com. paper, sec. 7o. It is too well settled to be
questioned that any material alteration of a commercial paper, unaccounted
for by him who holds it, is fatal to it. Miller vs. Reed, 27 Pa. 247. In this
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case, the holder of the note offered no evidence explaining the.presence of
the signature and of the seal on different lines. The defendant denies having placed a seal upon the instrument and alleges a Iteration of note after
delivery. When a contest occurs and the instrument is offered in evidence,
the question at once arises whether the alteration is beneficial to the party
offering it; if it be, as was the case here, we hold the party offering it in
evidence and seeking advantage ftom it, bound to explain the alteration to
the satisfaction of the jury. The initiative and burden of proof are thrown
upon him. Jordan vs. Stewart, 23 Pa. 249; Paine v. Edsell, ig Pa. 178.
Citizens and Miners Bank vs. Coon, 2 Kulp 134; Hill vs. Cooley, 46 Pa. 259;
Plaintiff has failed to establish his case. Therefore, we direct the jury to
find for the.defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
It is not disputed that the note in suit was executed by Rees. When
he wrote it he put the seal on it, or the seal was put on it later. There
is always a possibility that parts of a note have been put into it since
its execution, but upon this possibility no resolution is taken. Proven the signature, it will be assumed that all besides it was on the paper, unless something rebuts this assumption. Rebuttal might be found in the difference
of ink or pen used in the writing of the several parts, or in the difference of
chirography, or in the interlineation of some of these parts. It is not suggested that there is anything in the note in suit, which may be legitimately
suspected of having been put there after it left the hand of Rees, except the
seal, and the only reason for doubt, as to this, is its not being on the same
line as the signature.
The usual place of a seal is after the signature and substantially in
line with it. But a seal might be set before the name as well as after,
and, when after, out of line with the name. The seal is undoubtedly on
the paper. If'it was put there by some one other than Rees, with a view to
giving the note the quality of a sealed writing, why did he not put it in the
usual position? It is just as easy to think that Rees wrote it, as to think that
any one else did. If ignorance of the usual place of a seal, accounts for its being where it is, it is as easy to impute that ignorance to Rees as to another. If
haste in writing, if darkness, or other circumstance explains the unusual
position, it is as easy to believe Rees to have written it as anybody else.
Whoever put it on the note, intended it to be regarded by endorsee, or by
coart and jury, as connected with and qualifying the execution of the instrument, and this intention can as easily be ascribed to Rees as to any one
else.
The defendant has not furnished any evidence that he did not write the
seal. No peculiarity of ink, or of the style of the seal suggests that he did not
make it. We think the circumstances insufficient to justify the exclusion
of the note until the plaintiff tendered evidence of the presence of it on the
seal, at the time of its delivery by Rees, and that it was incumbent on him
to furnish evidence that it was not then on it.
If it was then on the note there is no visible defence to it. It is not
subject to the statute of limitations. Although a sealed note, made in 1891,
was not negotiable, a recovery in an action by the payee does not presuppose negotiability.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
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MIACKENZIE vs. TONE.
Contracts-Agency-Collateral contract of agent-ConsiderationStatute of fraud-Damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Tone, as agent for Samuel Staples, made with Mackenzie a contract to
sell to the latter a lot and house for $150o, of which $200 were paid at the
time, and the residue was to be paid in two years. Mackenzie demurred
much to entering into the contract,but Tone overcame his reluctance by promising in case Mackenzie should so desire to be freed from the contract to
pay Staples whatever was necessary to induce him to relinquish his claim
against Mackenzie, and to pay back to Mackenzie the $2oo with interest.
Mackenzie in six months notified Tone that he wanted to be relieved of the
contract, and desired the $2oo repaid. Tone refused to do what he had
promised to do, because his promise being oral, it was not binding. Mackenzie had to pay the remaining $13oo and accept deed from Staples or
loose the $2oo he bad paid. He sues Tone on his promise claiming $15oo.
Goldstein for the plaintiff.
Second contract was independent of contract for sale of lands. Where
agent exceeds authority conferred, he is personally liable. McCon vs. Lane,
io W. N. C. 493. Contract was not for sale of lands, hence does not violate
Statute of Frauds. Plaintiff may recover, as for breach of any ordinary
contract. Clark on Contracts, 525; Howard vs. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362.
Funk for defendant.
No liability for such debt incurred unless contract was in writing. Act
Ap. 28, 1855. There is no consideration for contract, and therefore it is not
enforcible.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
MULHEARN, J.:-The contract made by the agent Tone and the third
party was binding upon both Mackenzie and Staples. In so far as the contract to sell land was involved, the agent was acting within the scope of his
authority and upon Mackenzie paying the thirteen hundred '($1,300) dollars
the contract was consummated. Huffcut on Agency, page 212. There is
nothing in the statement of facts that would warrant us in assuming that the
contract by way of inducement
- agent was authorized to make a collateral
for the principal to rescind the contract for sale of the real estate. The
agreement between Tone and Mackenzie was not an agreement for the sale
of lands and was not invalid because not in writing. This is not an action
for deceit by the third party against the principal as insisted by the attorney
for the plaintiff in his argument, but, as the statement of facts plainly indicates when it says that the plaintiff sues Tone on his promise claiming
fifteen hundred ($i,5oo) dollars, is an action of assumpsit. Nor do we think
that the agreement is invalid for the reason that it involves a liability for
the debt of another as argued by the attorney for the defendant.
The agreement between Mackenzie and the agent being valid we think
the plaintiff should be allowed to recover not fifteen hundred ($x,5oo) dollars
but the actual damage sustained. Clark on Contracts, page 695.
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OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
We see no reason for holding that the contract between Mackenzie and
Tone is unenforcible. Tone was acting in making the contract to sell land,
as agent for Staples. In agreeing to induce Staples to liberate Mackenzie
from the contract, at some future time, he was acting forhimself. The agreement is not prohibited by law. It violates no policy of the state.
It does not violate the statute of frauds. Tone did not in entering into it
promise to pay the debt of another. Staples owed no debt. He was under no
duty to do that for the doing of which Tone undertook. Tone's agreement
was not to do that which Staples was bound to do, but to persuade Staples
to do that which he was not bound to do.
Nor does the contract of Tone contemplate the sale or the purchase of
land. Staples' contract, made by him as agent, was for such a sale, but
Tone's contract is to procure a release from Staples of Mackenzie from
Staples' contract. This is not a contract for any interest in land.
Mackenzie has obtained a conveyance of the land from Staples. It is
worth something, and probably, all or a large part of $i,5oo. The measure
of the damages therefore, is not the $r,5oo for which he has the equivalent,
but the difference, whatever it may be, between the value of the land and
the I r,;oo.
Affirmed.
PIKE vs. SHARPE.
Breach of Contract-Time of Bringing Actlon-fleasure of Damages.
STATEMENT OF CASE.
Sharpe, by writing, agreed to board with Pike for four years at rate Qf $6
per week. He began to board and continued for seven weeks, when leaving
the town in quest of employment, he informed Pike that he would board no
longer. Pike, five weeks after, brought an action against him for damages;
claiming $6 per week for the four years less seven weeks. No evidence was
given by Pike that he could nothave obtained a substitute boarder. Sharpe
proved that he did obtain a new boarder, two weeks after Sharpe left and
that, there being no room at Pike's table for two boarders, ff Sharpe had
remained the new boarder would not have been taken. The new boarder
has contracted to pay $7 per week but only for two years. The co6rt allowed
the jury to give as damages the difference between 4 X 52 X $6 and what
for that time the expense of Pike would have been to furnish the board.
Hicks for the plaintiff.
For violation of a contract, the measure of damages is the loss actually
sustained: Wesphall vs. Mapes. 3 Grant, 198: Hay vs. Grenale, 34 Pa. 9.
A plaintiff who claims damages for loss of a contract is as much bound
to prove that he has sustained damages as he is to prove the contract itself.
The jury cannot be asked to guess: Lentz et al. vs. Choteau, 42 Pa., 438;
Smith vs. Long, 132 Pa. 301.
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Paul Smith for the defendant.
Where a contract is broken by one of the parties the otherparty acquires
a right of action on the original contract and may maintain a suit to obtain
damages for the loss sustained by the breach: Krick vs. Breber, 148 Pa.
645.
The rule as to the measure of damages is that the plaintiff, so far as
money can do it, is to be placed in the same situation as if the contract had
been performed: Smith vs. Long, 132 Pa. 301; Lentz vs. Choteau, 42 Pa.
435OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COUBT.
LA BAR, J.:-The question for the court to determine is, what damages, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to recover for the breach of defendant's
contract to board with him for four years at six dollars per week? The
learned court below allowed the jury to give as damages the difference
between. 4 X 52 X $6 and what for that time the expenses of Pike would
have been to furnish the board.
Is this the correct measure of damages? We think it is. The general
rule for damages as laid down in Hadley vs. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, and
which has been affirmed and followed by nearly all the courts in this country,
is, that when two parties make a contract which one of them has broken,
the damages, which the other party ought to receive in respect to such
breach of contract, should be such as may fairly and reasonably be consid
ered either as arising naturally, i. e., according to the usual course of things
from such a breach of contract itself, orsuch as may reasonably be supposed
to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the
contract, as the probable result of it. Clark on Contracts p. 697.
A party to a contract is entitled to recover against the other party who
violates it, damages for the profits he would have made out of it had it been
performed. Sutherland on Damages p. 113, 3 L. R. A. 588.
The profits that the plaintiff would have realized from the defendant's
contract had it been fulfilled would clearly have been the difference between
the contract price and the cost of furnishing the board.
The appellant contends that the profits which the plaintiff may make
from the contract with the new boarder should go to mitigate the damages
occasioned by the defendant's breach of his contract; that the present case
is governed by the exception to the general rule, which exists in the case of
contracts for the hire of agents, laborers and domestic servants for a definite
period, in which class of cases it has been held that if one is wrongfully
discharged before the end of his term of service, he is entitled to recover for
the whole period, unless the defendant shows that the plaintiff was engaged
in other profitable service during the time sued for, or that he refused the
offer of such service.
That a contract to furnish board is a contract for purely personal services and within the above exception is a proposition to which we cannot
assent.
In 2 Greenleaf Evidence sec. 261a. the distinction is marked between
contracts for specific work and contracts for the hire of clerks, agents,
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laborers and domestic servants for a year or shorter determinate periods. In
the latter cass the learned author shows that the defendant may prove on a
breach of the contract, either that the plaintiff was actually engaged in other
profitable service during the term, or that such employment was offered to
him and he rejected it.
There is an evident distinction between such a hiring and a contract
for the performance of some specific undertaking. In the one case the
party can earn and expect to earn no more than single wages, and if he gets
that, his loss will generally be but nominal. King vs. Steiren. Whereas in
the other case the loss of the party is the loss of the benefits of the contract
he is prepared to perform.
In Dock vs. Pratt, 30 Pa. Superior s98 (x9o6) which was an action for
damages in part for breach of contract for board, the court said, after mentioning the above exception to the general rule, "without going into a discussion of the reason for the exception referred to, it is sufficient to say that
it has not been extended to contracts of the character of that set forth in the
plaintiff's declaration" and held, that the measure of damages as to the
board woild be the profits to the plaintiff after deducting the expenses.
In Wolf vs. Studebaker, 65 Pa. 45 9, S. leased her farm to W. and refused
him possession. In an action by W. for damages, S. was permitted to prove
that W. engaged in hauling which was more profitable to him than farming,
held, to be error. Thompson C. J. speaking for the court said inter alia,
"It cannot be that results utterly unconnected with the cause of action and
the party sued can be made to tell to his advantage. We think that that
which should mitigate damages in a contract like that we are considering
should be something resulting from the acts of the party occasioning the
injury or from the contract itself. The damages may be said to be fixed by
the law of the contract the moment it is broken, and I cannot see how that
is to be altered by collateral circumstances-independent of and totally disconnected from it and from the party occasioning it."
In the present case the mere fact that there was but room enough at
Pike's table for one boarder and that Pike chose to make but one boarding
contract at a time does not make any connection or relation between the
contracts. They are entirely independent and disconnected from each other,
and we do not see any reason or justice in the claim to offset the profits of
one against the loss occasioned by the breach of the other.
Judgment affirmed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The contract was for a period of four years. Only a small portion of
that time had elapsed, when this action was brou,,ht. The action Ntas
however, not premature. The defendant having indicated his intention no
longer to perform, gave to the plaintiff a right to an immediate action.
Dock vs. Pratt, 30 Super, 598; Wetmore vs. Jaffray, 9 Hun, 141; Colburn vs.
Woodworth, 31 Barb., 38!.
The important question is, what damages should be recoverable? By
the contract Sharpe was to pay $6 per week, or $312 per year, or$1248during
the four years. But, in order to earn this sum, under the contract, Pike
would have been compelled to pay a certain sum of money for'the provisions,
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which he was bound to furnish, and to supply service. His profit manifestly
would be the difference between the $i248 and the expenses necessary to
earn it. There can be no recovery for more than the difference; Lydecker
vs. Valentine, 24 N. Y. Supp. 567; 71 Hun, 194; Crane vs. Powell, i9 N. Y.
Supp, 22o, Dock vs. Pratt, 30 Super, 5o8; Feigel vs. Latour, i V. N. C. 335;
De Lavalette vs. Wendt, ii Hun, 432; Haggin vs. Price, 38 Ky. 48. Cf. Wilkinson vs. Davies, 146 N. Y. 25; Nixon vs. Myers, 141 Pa. 477.
But, since the suit has been brought before the close of the four years,
it is evident that not $1248 minus the expenses, should be recovered but only
the present worth of that sum. One dollar payable one year from now, is
now worth only 94 cents. There was error ir not distinguishing between the
worth today of a sum of money now to be received, and of the sum, receivable one, two, three years later.
The contract between Pike and Sharpe was tacitly conditioned on the
continuance in life of both of them during the four years. Had Sharp died,
his administrator would not have been bound to continue to receive, or at
least to pay for board for the remainder of the term. Had Pike died, his
administrator could not have been compelled to furnish the board. It cannot be known whether these parties will survive the four years. We think
that what the plaintiff should recover is not the present worth of the certainty of earning various sums of money from week to week, but the present
worth of the probability of earning them. Pike would not be willing to pay
for the chance of earning $2 weekly for four years, as much as he would
for the cerlainly of earning it. Nor should he expect the jury to pay him
so much.
The amount of profit realizable depends on the cost of food and service,
which during four years is susceptible of fluctuation. It might it is true
decline, as it might advance. Nevertheless, the uncertainty of it would
affect the price that prudent men would pay for the opportunity to make the
earnings during four years, and we do not think that the jury should appraise
the damages irrespective of the influence of this uncertainty. The plaintiff,
by bringing his suit before the expiration of the four years, is compelling the
jury to speculate as to what his earnings would be, and the uncertainty just,
adverted to, is a legitimate element of this speculation.
It appears that two weeks after Sharpe left, Pike obtained a new
boarder, who has engaged to take board at $7 per week, and for two years.
It further appears that Pike could not have taken this boarder, but for
Sharpe's departure. It is often the duty of one who suffers damage from
the breach of a contract or from a tort, to take steps to diminish the loss,
and so relieve the defaulter or wrongdoer. "It is therefore the duty" says
Page, 3 Contracts, 2409, in discussing this subject "of a discharged employee to seek other employment; of the owner of a vessel whose charterer
refuses to use and pay forit, to seek another charterer; of a lessee whose
lessor has refused to put him in possession of the premises, to lease others;
and in such cases, the amount which the injured party thus received from
others, or the amount which he might have received by the use of reasonable
care and diligence, must be deducted from the amount of damages," That
it was Pike's duty to find a substitute for Sharpe, if he reasonably could, is
the doctrine of Wetmore vs. Jaffray, 9 Hun, 141; Wilson vs. Martin, x Den-
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602; billon vs. Anderson, 43 N. Y. 231; Wilkinson vs. Davies, 146 N. Y.
25!;

De Lavallette vs. Wendt, ixi
Hun,

432.

It is not necessary for us to say here, that Pike was under a duty to
find, if he could, some one to take the place of Sharp. He in fact has done
so; and for two years, he is to receive one dollar a week more than, for
that time, he would have received from Sharp. We think that the amount
thus to be received, should be used in reduction of the damages.
The learned court below relies on Wolf vs. Studebaker, 65 Pa. 459 for
authority to justify the rejection of the earnings by the plaintiff from the
substitute boarder. The distinction there made between a "living" and a
performance of "some specific undertaking" is hopelessly vague. If A dismisses B improperly from his service, A when sued by B for damages can
show that B obtained (or even ought to have obtained) other service that,
had A continued to employ him, he could not have obtained, Emery vs.
Steckel, 126 Pa. 171. The only justification for this is, (a) that B ought to
employ his faculties and time if he can, and (b) that the new employment
manifestly could not have existed had the fist contract been performed.
In Wolf vs. Studebaker, the evidence left it uncertain whether the earnings
of the new work were as profitable as they were alleged to be. Thompson
C. J. does say that "it cannot be that results utterly unconnected with the
cause of action and the party sued, can be made to tell to his advantage,"a principle with which many cases are inconsistent. Here it distinctly
appears that Pike boarded the substitute under similar conditions to those
under which he boarded Sharpe, and could not have done so, had Sharpe
remained. There is no appreciable reason for denying to Sharpe the right
to show that his departure was not so great a loss to Pike as it would have
been had he not obtained another boarder, that would not be available to
exempt a party in any case, from the duty of doing anything to mitigate
damages, or to prevent the defaulting party from reducing the damages by
means of what the other party did: Cf, Garsed vs. Turner, 71 Pa. 56.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
WATSON vs. LAWSON.
Landlord and Tenant-Negligence--LlabllIty-Measure of Damages.
STATEMENT OF CASE.
Lawson was a tenant for one year, of a house at a rent of $120.00 per
year. The pavement before it, was in bad repair; some bricks being loose,
and considerable spaces being between them. In some way, one of these
bricks was displaced, and lay on the bricks near where it should have been.
Watson in walking stepped on this brick, which threw him down. The
leg was broken. The borough had notified Lawson's landlord, before the
lease to him was made, to repair the pavement, but he had not done so.
Trespass, damages claimed $3oo.oo.
Mulhearn for the plaintiff.
A tenant or occupant is always liable for an injury caused by his neglect.
Bears vs. Ambler, 9 Pa. 193.
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A tenant in possession is under the same obligation as the landlord,
unless his landlord has covenanted to make repairs: Grier vs. Sampson,
201 Pa. 183.
Kopyscianski for the defendant.
An owner of property cannot escape liability for an existing nuisance
thereon by demising it to a tenant and putting him in possession: Fow vs.
Robert, xo8 Pa. 489; Knauss vs. Brua, 107 Pa. 85.
Repairs made to a pavement are permanent repairs, and a tenant is not
bound to make permanent repairs: Wood on Nuisances Sec. 73. P- 124.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
SHIPMAN, J.:-'This is an action of trespass for damages for injuries
caused by falling on a defective pavement. The question in the case is
whether the one injured can recover from a tenant in possession when the
defects in the sidewalk existed before his occupancy began, or whether, if
he can recover at all, he can only do so from the landlord or owner of the
premises. The defendant in this case is the tenant.
The main argument advanced by the counsel for the defense is that the
landlord, and not the tenant, is the only one from whom damages can be
recovered by one injured by a defective pavement which existed before the
lease was given to the tenant. In this we think he has misconstrued the
case. The question here is not one of making repairs, but is a matter of
original construction being permitted to continue. It is a case in which the
premises were let with a nuisance upon them and there was no agreement
from the tenant to abate the nuisance nor to repair the premises. Under
such circumstances we do not doubt but the landlord would be secondarily
liable. A long line of cases from Knauss vs. Brua, 107 Pa., 85, down to
Brookville Borough vs. Arthurs, 152 Pa., 334 and Reading City vs. Renier,
167 Pa., 41, is conclusive on this point. The only exception appears in the
case of Mintzer vs. Hogg, 192 Pa., 137, and that case, as regards the point
in question, is specifically overruled by Lindstrom vs. Penna. Co., 212 Pa.,
39
But we do not think the conclusiveness of the landlord's liability
will
excuse the tenant in this case. A tenant in possession is under the same
obligations as the landlord, unless his landlord has covenanted to make
repairs, and the evidence does not show the existence of any such covenant.
The landlord merely had notice of the defective condition of the sidewalk
from the borough.
Although the sidewalk in question had been defective long before the
tenant took possession of the premises he was bound to guard against the
danger to which the public had been before exposed and he was liable for
the consequences of having neglected to do so in the same manner as if he
himself had originated the nuisance: See Reading City vs. Renier, 167 Pa.,
44, cited above.

Again, in "Trickett on Landlord and Tenant," Page 666, it is said, "Itis the duty of the tenant or other persons in possession of premises facing
upon the street, towards persons using the street, to keep the sidewalks in
safe condition." Moreover, the rule of law is that in the absence of any
contract to the contrary the tenant is bound to keep the premises in repair:
Long vs. Fitzsimmons, i W

S. 530.
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But we think that Bears vs. Ambler, 9 Pa., 193, is analogous to and
decisive of the present case. In that case it was held that a tenant or occu
pier is always liable for an injury caused by his neglect, irrespective of any
contract between him and the landlord or owner of the property. So far as
the public is concerned it is nothing to them who may be ultimately liable
for repairs. It is the duty of the tenant or occupier in the first instance to
keep the ways in such order as not to endanger others, whatever may be
his agreement with the landlord or owner of the premises. And this im"posesno hardship on him of which he can justly complain, as the landlord
is liable on his contract or his expenditure may be deducted from the rent.
Third persons have no means of ascertaining their agreement. The tenant
is always, the landlordmay, under Peculiarcircumstances,be liablefor an
injury to a thirdfrrson arisingfrom negligence.
As to the defendant's negligence we think a tenant in possession may
reasonably be held, from his continual occupation and his going in and out
of the -premises, to have notice of a defect in the pavement as soon as it
exists. In this case the loose brick primarily caused the injury, and there
was negligence on the part of the tenant in either not seeing the brick, or
having seen it, in not removing the same.
Therefore (i) Because the landlord's liability does not excuse the tenant.
(z) Because the primary defect was one which it was negligence not to see
and repair, and (3) Because the tenant might have repaired the pavement
and deducted the expense from the rent (since the defect was one needing
immediate attention), the defendant is liable in this'case.
As to the notification from the borough to the landlord, since the defect
existed on a public thoroughfare, we think it was given either to exempt the
borough from liability in an action of trespass by the plaintiff against it, or,
in the event of damages being recovered against it in such an action, to en.
able it to recover from the landlord, after notice had been given.
In regard to the amount of damages to be recovered by the plaintiff
the elements of doctor-bill, mental suffering, permanent injury, loss of time
and wages, etc., would all enter into consideration, but the assessment itself
is one of the tasks of the jury.
From the foregoing conclusions and the weight of the authorities, we
feel justified in deciding that the plaintiff can recover to the full amount of
his injuries in this action.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The action is against Lawson, the tenant. The question immediately
before us is not whether the landlord would have been liable. It is quite
possible for both the landlord and the tenant, or even the borough, and the
landlord and the tenant to be simultaneously liable to the plaintiff. Perhaps
the fact that the pavement was in bad condition when the lease was made,
would make the landlord responsible. The question before us is, whether
that fact excused the tenant. We think the learned court below has properly
decided that it did not. The tenant was in possession sufficiently long to
become aware of the condition of the pavement and to amend it. As
occupier with power thus to amend it, it was his duty to do so towards
pedestrians walking upon it.
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The landlord's duty to repair the pavement did not rest upon the bor
ough's requiring him to repair. Its notice simply brought home to him the
fact that the repair was necessary. His duty was complete to make it.
This duty he did not devolve from himself upon the the tenant, when he
made the lease. But neither did the tenant escape falling under the duty
towards third persons to repair, because the lessor was under such a duty.
Affirmed.
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The earlier volumes of this great work have been before the public for
some years and their merits have become well known to the profession.
The present volume is a revision of an earlier 4 th volume, embracing syllabi
of all the decisions in volumes 176 to 2o2 of the United States Reports, the
citation, in those decisions of all earlier decisions, as well as citations of
,Supreme Court decisions found in the Federal Reporter, 10[-144 inclusive.
A very valuable part of this volume, is the Subject-matter Index-Digest,
extending from p. 5603 to p. 6169, and being a digest of all the supreme
court decisions down to 202 U. S. Litigation in the Federal courts is constantly increasing, and even in controversies in state courts, the questions
involving the Constitution and the federal statutes, are greatly multiplying.
For the solution of such questions, accesslo the decisions of the highestfedCral court is indispensable. It is not too much to say that for this SyllabusDigest there is no passable succedaneum. When it is considered that this
volume containing nearly 1400 pages, is on excellent paper, in large type;
and admirably bound, it seems to be a marvel of cheapness. To those who
are familiar with the first three volumes, no encouragement to procure this
is necessary. To those who have not yet had their attention directed to
this great work, we are doing a service which they will appreciate, in impressing on them its immense utility.

